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Note
Property Law and Fourth
Amendment Privacy Protection
Rakas v. Illinois, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 421 (1978).
The great end for which men entered into society was to secure their prop-
erty. Boyd v. United States1
[T] he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
Katz v. United States2
The Court today holds that the Fourth Amendment protects property, not
people .... Rakas v. Illinois3
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has in recent years attempted to minimize
the social costs4 involved in the exclusion of illegally seized evi-
dence by focusing solely on the deterrent aspect of the exclusion-
ary rule when balancing societal interest in the rule against
societal interest in fourth amendment5 security or privacy inter-
ests. The movement towards limiting the application of the exclu-
sionary rule has seen the Court reject the rule when it would not
1. 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886) (Bradley, J., majority opinion) (quoting Lord Camden
in Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howells 1029 (1765)).
2. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (Stewart, J., majority opinion).
3. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 421, 437 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
4. "Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the search
for truth at trial is deflected." Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 427. E.g., Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 489-90 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348-50
(1974). Thus, it has been urged that, "the social cost of excluding relevant
evidence should be incurred only when it is likely to deter unreasonable
searches." White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118
U. PA. L. REv. 333, 338 (1970).
5. The amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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produce the desired deterrent effect,6 create an attenuation doc-
trine,7 limit collateral review,8 and decide that some individuals
lacked "standing" to raise an objection under the amendment.9
Central to the Court's reasoning has been the notion that since
fourth amendment rights are personal rights, only those individu-
als whose rights have been violated by an unlawful search or
seizure may seek suppression of the evidence.' 0
In Rakas v. Illinois," the Supreme Court was presented with
the issue of whether passengers had "standing" to object to the
warrantless search and seizure of items in an automobile in which
they were lawfully riding. In a five-four decision, the Court repudi-
ated its previous statements' 2 concerning "standing" and noted
that the inquiry was "more properly subsumed under substantive
Fourth Amendment doctrine.' 3 The Court explicitly rejected the
"legitimately on the premises" test 4 expounded in Jones v. United
6. Harris v. United States, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
7. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The attenuation doctrine al-
lows introduction of evidence which has been gained by illegal government
activity if the means of acquiring the evidence are sufficiently removed and
distinguishable from the initial illegality. The test employed by the Court is:
"[W)hether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that ille-
gality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint." Id. at 488.
8. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
9. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973). See Trager & Lobenfeld, The Law
of Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 421 (1975).
10. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). See, e.g., Brown v. United
States, 411 U.S. 223, 230 (1973); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389
(1968); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963). See also Zurcher
v. Stanford Daily, - U.S. -, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1980 n.9 (1978). The Court's early
struggle with defining the scope of the amendment emphasized invasions
upon personal property interests. The underlying analysis employed by the
Court has been described as follows:
[Tihe amendment refers to the right of the people to be secure in
'their' persons, houses, papers, and effects. Although the word 'their'
is the plural, the Court has not allowed the defendant to raise a third
person's fourth amendment rights. He may only assert his rights.
'His' is a possessive word, meaning the defendant must have pos-
sessed the property being searched or seized before his interests are
protected by the amendment. Possession is a property concept, so
property law is controlling. The early standing litigation, therefore,
involved definitions of property interests as well as the scope of the
amendment.
Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to
Challenge Searches and Seizures, 40 Mo. L. REV. 1, 29 (1975).
11. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978).
12. See text accompanying notes 39-49 & 75-76 infra.
13. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 428.
14. See text accompanying note 49 infra.
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States15 as a test for "standing." Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, stated that where passengers "asserted neither a
property nor a possessory interest in the automobile, nor an inter-
est in the property seized,"'16 the passengers failed to show a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy sufficient to claim a violation of their
own fourth amendment rights.
17
The Court, by distinguishing both Jones v. United States18 and
Katz v. United States19 on their facts,20 implicitly shifted back in
its fourth amendment analysis to the importance of property law
concepts in defining the area in which an individual may legiti-
mately hold a reasonable expectation of privacy from governmen-
tal intrusion. By so holding, the Court reopened the question of
exactly when and under what circumstances an individual can
properly claim fourth amendment protection.
This note will discuss the concept of standing as it relates to the
fulfillment of the purposes of the exclusionary rule. It will also dis-
cuss the relationship of privacy and property interests as they are
used by the Court to define the scope of fourth amendment protec-
tions.
II. THE FACTS OF RAKAS
On the evening of February 4, 1975, a clothing store in Bourbon-
nais, Illinois was robbed by two masked men. A police officer on
routine patrol on a highway, four and one-half miles north of the
robbery site, was given a radio description of the two men and of
the getaway car.21 After receiving this information, the police of-
ficer observed a car of similar make and model, but of a different
color and bearing a different license number. The officer followed
the vehicle which was being driven by a woman and which con-
tained one female and two male passengers. The car was eventu-
ally stopped by several police officers and the occupants were
ordered from the vehicle at gunpoint. The vehicle was searched by
two officers who discovered a box of rifle shells in the locked glove
compartment and a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger's
seat.22 Before the search, none of the occupants were placed
under arrest. Permission to conduct the search was neither sought
15. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
16. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 433.
17. Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 434 n.17.
18. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
19. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 434.
21. Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 5, Rakas v. Illi-
nois, - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978). The actual getaway car was a vehicle
taken from one of the victims of the robbery. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 5.
22. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 392.
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nor given and the seized evidence was not visible outside the vehi-
cle.2 3 Upon discovering the rifle and shells, the occupants of the
vehicle were placed under arrest.
Before trial, the defendant-passengers moved to suppress the
rifle and shells seized on the ground that the search violated the
fourth and fourteenth amendments. The defendants conceded
that the woman driving the car owned the vehicle. At the suppres-
sion hearing the prosecutor made an oral motion to dismiss on the
ground that the defendants lacked "standing," having failed to as-
sert ownership of the seized items. The trial court, agreeing with
the argument, denied suppression.24 As a result, the court did not
determine whether there was probable cause for the search and
seizure. The gun and shells were eventually introduced into evi-
dence at the trial and the defendants were convicted for the rob-
bery of the clothing store.
25
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling, reasoning
that "without a proprietary or other similar interest in an automo-
bile, a mere passenger therein lacks standing to challenge the le-
gality of the search of the vehicle." 26 The Supreme Court took the
case on a writ of certiorari after the Illinois Supreme Court denied
leave to appeal.
27
IIL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
One of the early statements of the Supreme Court with regard
to the scope of the protections afforded by the fourth amendment
23. Brief for Petitioners at 4.
24. Brief for Petitioners at 4-6. The discussion which was raised at the hearing
and decided adversely as to the defendants proceeded in part:
[Prosecutor]: We move to dismiss on the basis of Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165. The Supreme Court says that as to the
Fourth Amendment, there is no standing to contest its validity under
these circumstances. It has to be the one whose rights are violated -
the aggrieved party - by the introduction of damaging evidence. It
wasn't their [Petitioners'] car. It wasn't their shells. It wasn't their
rifle. I think the only one that has standing would be Janette [sic]
Clontz [owner] and she isn't here.
[Defense counsel]: She isn't charged in this at this time. And I
don't think they have to admit these are their items. I think they do
have a standing which they have shown.
The Court: Well, I believe the law says what counsel says it says.
These men have no standing to contest the validity of the search. It
wasn't their car. They have no control over it. The only person that
could complain would be the one who was driving it at the time or
who owned the car.
Id. (emphasis added).
25. People v. Rakas, 46 Ill. App.3d 569, 360 N.E.2d 1252 (1977).
26. Id. at 571, 360 N.E.2d at 1253.
27. 435 U.S. 922 (1977).
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was made in Boyd v. United States.28 The Court in Boyd, held un-
constitutional a statute which permitted the government to order
an accused to produce shipping invoices of alleged illegally im-
ported goods.2 9 The majority opinion effectively tied the assertion
of a fourth amendment protection to the fifth amendment's privi-
lege against compelled testimony.3 0 The Court noted that the
fourth amendment was to "apply to all invasions on the part of the
government.., of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life."
3 1
While the Boyd Court recognized a privacy interest, that inter-
est was defined in terms of personal property. In line with this
reasoning the Court in a subsequent decision, held that the gov-
ernment could seize only contraband articles in which a person
could not assert a legitimate interest.32 Property law concepts dur-
ing this period were often used by the Court to define the parame-
ters of that legitimate interest.
33
The scope of the protection of "persons, houses, papers and ef-
fects" 4 was later determined on an area-by-area basis.35 With the
development of the exclusionary rule,3 6 the question became
whether the place searched was recognized as a constitutionally
28. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 630, 633.
31. Id. at 630.
32. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 308-09 (1921).
33. See O'Brien, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Principles and Policies of
Fourth Amendment-Protected Privacy, 13 NEw ENG. I REv. 662, 672-85 (1978);
Comment, The Relationship Between Trespass and Fourth Amendment Pro-
tection After Katz v. United States, 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 709 (1977); Note, From
Private Places to Personal Privacy; A Post Katz Study of Fourth Amendment
Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 968 (1968).
34. See note 5 supra.
35. See O'Brien, supra note 33, at 672-94.
36. The exclusionary rule was created by the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), where the Court broke with common law tradition
and inquired into the source of evidence used at trial. The rule prevents the
government from using evidence which it has gained through unlawful
means. It was developed from the common law suit in replevin as a remedy
for an illegal search or seizure. The plaintiff in the replevin action had to
show that his right to present possession of the seized items was superior to
that of the government. The government was at that time strictly limited to
seizure of contraband or the instrumentalities of the crime. This "mere evi-
dence" rule was abandoned by the Court in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
300-10 (1967), when the Court began to redefine the scope of the amendment
in terms of privacy interests. The exclusionary rule was not applied to the
states until after the Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See
generally J. LANDYNSKi, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT
(1966); Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 m-N. L. REV.
349 (1974); Knox, supra note 10.
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protected area.37 The legacy of Boyd was therefore twofold. First,
by connecting the fourth amendment right to the fifth amendment
privilege, the Court limited the broad language of the former to
only those individuals who directly suffered the indignity of a gov-
ernmental intrusion. The development of an ancillary rule of
standing to assert an objection came as a logical adjunct to that
analysis.3 8 Secondly, although a privacy interest was recognized it
was implicitly limited by property law concepts.
A major turning point in the Court's fourth amendment analy-
sis came with the decision of Jones v. United States.3 9 Jones had
been a guest in the apartment of a friend who had entrusted him
with a key to the apartment. He had kept a suit and shirt at the
apartment, but did not stay there regularly.4° He did not pay for
the use of the apartment. Pursuant to a search warrant naming
Jones and a woman as the occupants, the police searched the
apartment and discovered illegal narcotics. The lower courts de-
nied Jones's motion to suppress, solely on the grounds that he
lacked standing. The Court, determined that Jones had standing
as defined with reference to Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.41 The test that the court employed, based on
the rule, was that:
In order to qualify as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure' one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against
whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims
prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a
search or seizure directed at someone else.
42
The court noted that in cases like Jones, where the defendant
was charged with a possessory offense, a dilemma existed if tradi-
tional standing rules applied.43 The general requirement for stand-
ing was that the person seeking suppression claim either
ownership or possession of the property or a "substantial posses-
37. See O'Brien, supra note 33, at 693-701.
38. The "standing" concept in the fourth amendment area was first mentioned
with approval by the Court in Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121
(1942). See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 36, at 74.
39. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
40. In his cross-examination at trial, Jones testified that he had slept there
"maybe a night." Id. at 259.
41. Id. at 264. "A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move
the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the re-
turn of the property and to suppress for use as evidence anything so ob-
tained. .. ." FED. R. CRnu. P. 41(e). The Court later held that Rule 41(e)
conformed to and was not broader than the general constitutional standard.
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 173 n.6 (1969).
42. 362 U.S. 257, 261 (emphasis added). See generally Gutterman, "A Person Ag-
grieved'" Standing to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence in Transition, 23
EMORY L.J. 111 (1974).
43. 362 U.S. at 263.
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sory interest in the premises searched."44 At that time, however, if
the defendant asserted ownership at the suppression hearing and
his claim was denied, his testimony at the hearing could be used at
trial to prove the charge of possession.45 To avoid this dilemma the
Court held that where the same element in the prosecution, i.e.
possession, served to both convict and confer standing, the defend-
ant would have "automatic standing."
46
More importantly, as a second reason for conferring standing,
the Court held that Jones's connection with the apartment had sat-
isfied the legally requisite interest in the premises. 47 The Court
explicitly discredited the theory urged by the government that
property concepts were definitive of protected privacy interests
when it stated that: "it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import
into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed
and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private
property law ... ."48 The Court vastly broadened the scope of
standing and concluded that:
No just interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous enforce-
ment of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing that anyone le-
gitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by
way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be used
against him.
4 9
The Supreme Court's holding in Jones was the forerunner of a
broadened interpretation of the fourth amendment.
Jones was followed by a line of cases which further eroded prior
notions that property law concepts defined the scope of the privacy
interest protected by the fourth amendment.5 0 These cases were
highlighted by the decision in Katz v. United States.5 ' In Katz, the
Court held that the government's activities in electronically moni-
toring the defendant's half of a conversation in a public phone
booth constituted a search and seizure and violated the privacy
44. Id. at 261.
45. The Court noted that it was "by no means an inevitable holding" that the
defendant's hearing testimony could later be used. Id. at 262. The Court
eventually held, in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,394 (1968), that the
defendant's testimony given at the hearing could not be used against him at
trial on the issue of guilt unless the defendant made no objection. As a result
of Simmons, the continuing validity of automatic standing has been placed in
question. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229-30 (1973).
46. 362 U.S. at 263. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 226, 228 (1973).
47. 362 U.S. at 263.
48. Id. at 266.
49. Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
50. E.g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
51. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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upon which the defendant justifiably relied.52 Justice Harlan, con-
curring, agreed with the Court's opinion that "'the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people, not places,' "3 but suggested that the
answer as to what protection the amendment afforded those peo-
ple often required reference to a place.5 4 Harlan translated the
justifiable reliance test of the majority into a two-pronged test.55
For Harlan, the expectation of privacy which was sought to be cov-
ered under the amendment had to reach a level that "society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ",56 The reasonable or legiti-
mate expectation of privacy test which Harlan formulated in Katz
has since been the paradigm for fourth amendment analysis.5 7
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
A. The Fail of Standing
The relief sought in Rakas was an order requiring the state
court to determine the ultimate question of whether the search
was lawful.5 8 Several lower courts, faced with similar claims,
granted standing to automobile passengers5 9 Significantly, the de-
fendants failed to allege either ownership or a possessory interest
in the seized property.6 0 It has been suggested that the Court
could have treated this as a waiver of a known right and thus a
52. Id. at 353.
53. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
54. Id.
55. Id. "[T]here is a two-fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Note, A Recon-
sideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REV. 154, 157
(1977). Harlan's reworking of the majority's test has received heated criti-
cism. Professor Amsterdam has stated that "justifiable reliance" might be
considered equivalent to a claim of right, whereas the "expectations" test
makes an individual's privacy vulnerable to government usurpation. Amster-
dam, supra note 36, at 382-85.
56. 389 U.S. at 361.
57. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322 (1973); Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224 (1972); United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745 (1971); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968).
58. Brief for Petitioners at 8.
59. See United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 867 (5th Cir. 1975), affd in relevant
part on rehearing en banc, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976); Bustamonte v.
Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 700 n.1 (9th Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 412
U.S. 218 (1973); United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94, 105 (4th Cir. 1962); Mul-
lins v. State, 35 Md. App. 605, 609, 371 A.2d 713, 716 (1977); State v. Bresolin, 13
Wash. App. 386, 398, 534 P.2d 1394, 1402 (1975). But see State v. Heath, 222
Kan. 50, 52, 563 P.2d 418, 420 (1977); State v. Perkins, 543 S.W.2d 805, 807-08
(Mo. App. 1976).
60. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 423-24 n.1.
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pleading error.61 Instead, the Court considered the defendants'
two arguments for standing, one based on a "directed at" or target
theory and the other based on the passengers "legitimate pres-
ence" in the automobile at the time of the stop and search.
1. Rejection of a Target Theory of Standing
Defendants urged that the Court's definition in Jones, of a vic-
tim of an illegal search as "one against whom the search was di-
rected" 62 provided support for the target theory. This theory was
originally asserted by Justice Fortas in his opinion in Alderman v.
United States.63 Fortas had viewed the fourth amendment and the
exclusionary rule as a general prohibition of a type of police con-
duct rather than a limited protection of an individual's right to pri-
vacy.64 Applying the reasoning of the Court in Jones, Fortas
argued that the Court should "include within the category of those
who may object to the introduction of illegal evidence 'one against
whom the search was directed.' "65 Speaking of the aggrieved per-
son, Fortas argued: "The Government violates his rights when it
seeks to deprive him of his liberty by unlawfully seizing evidence
in the course of an investigation of him and using it against him at
trial."66
Justice Harlan in a separate opinion answered Fortas by noting
that such a broadened standing rule would only marginally affect
the impact of the exclusionary rule on unconstitutional police con-
duct and would impose substantial administrative difficulties.
67
The majority opinion in Alderman reflected Harlan's concerns and
stated: "[W] e are not convinced that the additional benefits of ex-
tending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify en-
croachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused
of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all
the evidence which exposes the truth."
6 8
Shortly after the Court's decision in Alderman, its perceived ef-
fect on the deterrence of illegal police conduct was the subject of
criticism. It was suggested that:
61. Kramer, Standing to Challenge Illegal Searches After Rakas v. Illinois, 6
SEARCH AND SEIZURE L. REP. 1, 3 (1979).
62. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
63. 394 U.S. 165, 200 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. Id. at 205-06.
65. Id. at 208.
66. Id. at 209.
67. Id. at 188 n.1 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. Id. at 174-75. This does not prevent a state from abolishing the standing re-
quirement in the fourth amendment area. See Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6
Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971), appeal dismissed, 407 U.S. 917
(1972).
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If standing is to be retained, the reason for retention will be that the rule
bears a reasonable relation to the deterrent objective of the exclusionary
rule. In its present form it merely encourages the police to search the
homes of people they believe to be innocent, leaving the privacy of those
they believe to be guilty undisturbed. This encouragement is certainly not
consistent with the purpose underlying exclusion.
6 9
To conform to the purposes of the exclusionary rule the authors of
this argument recommended an objective target theory which
would assess the officer's probable intent at the time of the search
and determine from this whether an unlawful search was in-
tended.70 The administrative problems suggested by Justice
Harlan would be solved by creating an irrebuttable presumption
that police intend to obtain evidence against those they search or
those who own or possess property searched.7 ' This proposed so-
lution has not as yet found popular acceptance by a majority of the
Court.
Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Alderman, several
lower courts have applied a target analysis when granting or deny-
ing standing.7 2 The Court in Rakas, however, found the reasoning
of the Alderman Court which prevented the vicarious assertion of
fourth amendment privacy rights persuasive, and rejected the de-
fendants' claim for standing.73 Thus, the Court held true to the an-
cient precedent of Boyd v. United States74 and retained the notion
of personal rather than societal fourth amendment protection.
2. Demise of "Legitimate Presence" Test
The Court did not need to recognize a broadened standing rule
such as the target theory if it would have adhered to its previous
standing tests. The "legitimately on the premises" test of Jones
was the core of the defendants' argument and had been recently
incorporated in a three-prong test in Brown v. United States.75 The
issue in Brown was whether the defendants had standing to chal-
lenge the lawfulness of the seizure of merchandise stolen by them,
but stored at a co-conspirator's warehouse. The Court held that
the defendants lacked standing76 since they:
(a) were not on the premises at the time of the contested search and
seizure; (b) alleged no proprietary or possessory interest in the premises;
69. White & Greenspan, supra note 4, at 348.
70. Id. at 353-55.
71. Id.
72. United States v. Cobb, 432 F.2d 716, 719-20 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Rosenberg, 416 F.2d 680, 682 (7th Cir. 1969); State v. Hink, 6 Wash. App. 374,
375, 492 P.2d 1053, 1055 (1972).
73. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 425.
74. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
75. 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
76. Id. at 229.
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and (c) were not charged with an offense that includes, as an essential
element of the offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the
time of the contested search and seizure.
7 7
The three-pronged test in Brown recognized, in order: legitimate
presence, traditional property rights, and automatic standing as
sufficient grounds for a defendant to be heard on a motion to sup-
press.7 8
The Supreme Court in Rakas, nevertheless, viewed fourth
amendment standing as an artificial rule and noted that none of its
decided cases would have reached different results had they been
decided on the meritsJ 9 The Court thus dispensed with a separate
notion of standing and reframed the issue in terms of whether the
disputed search and seizure infringed on an interest of the defend-
ant which was protected by the amendment.
The Court was left to determine whether there had been a sub-
stantive violation of the passengers' fourth amendment rights. The
Jones test, on its face, did not protect those wrongfully present,
but in the instant case there was no question but that the defend-
ant-passengers were properly present. The Supreme Court chose
to reject the board description of the protected interest given in
Jones, and held that legitimate presence created too broad a gauge
for judging fourth amendment rights.
80
The Court cited a series of cases which reached diametrically
opposed results out of fact situations which arguably would have
produced consistent holdings had the legitimately on the premises
test presented a workable standard.81 Justice Rehnquist con-
cluded from this that, "'legitimately on premises' has not shown to
be an easily applicable measure of Fourth Amendment rights as it
has proved to be simply a label placed by the courts on results
which have not been subjected to careful analysis. '82 While the
Court did not overrule Jones, it limited the holding to its facts and
stated it "merely stands for the unremarkable proposition that a
person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than
his own home .... "183
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 428.
80. Id.
81. Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 431 n.13. The best illustrations of the Court's point was
the decision in United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690
(E.D.N.Y. 1977), where the defendant was granted standing to object to a
search of a co-defendant's person at an airport because of his lawful presence
at the time of the search. Id. at 695.
82. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 433.
83. Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 430. Cf. United States v. Hunt, 505 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1974)
(requires cognizable property interest), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 974 (1975).
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B. "Reasonable Expectations" After Rakas
Justice Rehnquist did not give a clear indication of what a de-
fendant needed to show in order to achieve a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy. The Court suggested that a visitor, or presumably
a passenger, could object to a search on the basis of his or her pres-
ence if their own property was seized during the search.84 But it is
not clear whether the assertion of a property or possessory inter-
est alone would satisfy the Court without the additional showing of
a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court suggested that,
"one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in
all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of
this right to exclude. '85 While noting that common law property
interests need not be the basis of an expectation of privacy, the
Court stated that these interests had not been abandoned alto-
gether when it sought to determine the scope of the amendment's
protection.86
Two recent decisions would suggest that both a property right
and a reasonable expectation of privacy are required before the
Court will recognize an unlawful invasion of a protected fourth
amendment interest. In Cardwell v. Lewis,87 the Court held that
where probable cause existed, a warrantless examination of an au-
tomobile's exterior wheel and the taking of paint scrapings from
the vehicle which had been parked in a public place, was not an
unreasonable search under the fourth amendment.88 While the
Court suggested that the interior of an automobile could carry
some degree of protection, 89 it failed to acknowledge an expecta-
tion of privacy in the car's exterior. A property interest in the car,
standing alone, was not a sufficient interest to raise a successful
objection to the police conduct.90
In a second case, Couch v. United States,91 the Court noted that
a taxpayer could not reasonably claim, for either fourth or fifth
amendment purposes, an expectation of privacy in documents
which had been turned over to the possession of her tax account-
ant.9 2 The defendant's inability to assert possession defeated her
claim to a privacy interest where there was no recognized account-
84. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 430 n.11.
85. Id. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 431.
86. Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 431-32.
87. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
88. Id. at 588-89.
89. Id. at 591.
90. Id. at 589.
91. 409 U.S. 322 (1973). See Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States
(1886-1976), 76 MICH. L. REV. 184, 211-12 (1977), which suggested that the sig-
nificance of Couch was that it effectively overruled Boyd.
92. 409 U.S. at 335-36.
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ant-client privilege. The question which Couch left unresolved
was whether an owner of property who entrusts her property to
the possession and safekeeping of another may lawfully object to
an illegal search of the other's premises when that search results
in the seizure of the entrusted item.
This situation arose in United States v. Lisk.93 This Seventh
Circuit decision offered a novel analysis of fourth amendment is-
sues. The defendant had delivered a pipe bomb to a friend and
requested that he keep the bomb in the trunk of his car until he
asked for its return. The government thereupon unlawfully seized
the bomb from the trunk and charged Lisk with illegal possession
of a firearm. In assessing the defendant's interest the Court stated:
There is a difference between a search and a seizure. A search involves
an invasion of privacy; a seizure is a taking of property. The owner of a
chattel which has been seized certainly has standing to seek its return. It
does not necessarily follow that he may also object to its use as evidence
In sum, defendant has standing to object to the seizure, but no standing to
object to the search. Having put the search to one side, he has not demon-
strated that the evidence should be suppressed on the ground that his
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the seizure.
9 f
By separating the privacy and property aspects of fourth amend-
ment protection the court gave a unique interpretation of the
amendment. The Supreme Court's decisions in Rakas, Cardwell,
and Couch, however, suggest that both interests must coalesce
before an individual will be deemed to have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.
V. THE CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion in Rakas,95 suggested
three criteria for assessing a legitimate expectation of privacy: (1)
whether precautions were taken to maintain privacy; (2) the way a
person used a location, as in Jones; and (3) a common law property
interest.9 6 For the concurring justices, the last item would serve as
the focal point for fourth amendment privacy expectations.
97
The dissent was unable to distinguish Rakas's expectations of
privacy from those found in Jones and Katz.98 Katz had no posses-
93. 522 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976), on rehearing
after remand, 559 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1977). See Recent Developments, 64
GEO. L.J. 1187 (1976).
94. 522 F.2d at 230-31 (emphasis in original). See generally Knox, supra note 11,
at 42-44.
95. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 434. (Powell, J., concurring).
96. Id. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 435.
97. Id.
98. Id. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 437, 442 (White, J., dissenting).
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sory interest in the phone booth, unless of course that interest was
created by his paying the toll. Moreover, the Court had explicitly
recognized fourth amendment protection for a passenger in a taxi-
cab.99 In the end, the dissent viewed the Court's opinion as an
evisceration of the principles which underlay the exclusionary
rule---"the deterrence of bad-faith violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment."' 00
VI. A RECOMMENDED SOLUTION
The Court should have begun its analysis by recognizing and
protecting the three distinct privacy interests that Professor Wein-
reb has outlined.' 0' These have been described as privacy of pres-
ence, privacy of place, and privacy of possession. 02 The first,
privacy of presence, would require the government to recognize a
protected zone or sphere which would surround and follow the in-
dividual in his or her daily life and be readily subject to definition
by a reasonable expectation analysis. This would afford protection
for Mr. Katz in a public phone booth. The second, privacy of place,
would protect more permanent features, e.g., the home. An exam-
ple of this was in Alderman v. United States,0 3 where the Court
held that evidence obtained through electronic surveillance of con-
versations emanating from a defendant's home was constitution-
ally protected even though the defendant was not a party to the
conversation. Lastly, a person's possessions should carry with
them some protection of privacy. This protection would cover
those cases where the defendant had automatic standing as well as
situations analogous to Couch. 0 4 Thus, if the Court had applied
this type of analysis in Rakas, it would have more closely consid-
ered the quality and nature of the defendant's presence. 05 Addi-
tionally, the Court could have considered as it did, property law
concepts to determine whether the mere fact of ownership of the
vehicle carried with it a justifiable expectation of privacy. Lack of
ownership of the vehicle would not necessarily defeat a protected
privacy expectation but would be one factor to consider. Finally,
the person's possessory interest in the seized property should
have been considered. Here the defendant's failure to claim an in-
99. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
100. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 443.
101. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHL L. REV. 47, 52-68
(1974).
102. Id.
103. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
104. See text accompanying notes 91-92.
105. "[P]hysical presence, or the lack thereof, the duration of the visit, the pur-
pose thereof, as well as the actual place of the search or seizure, are all rele-
vant factors. . . ." Trager & Lobenfeld, supra note 9, at 448.
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terest in the rifle and shells tended to defeat an expectation of pri-
vacy in those items. 106 While privacy of place and possession
would tend to be easily applied, the more amorphous shrouds of
privacy that most of us expect follow us in our daily affairs would
be the most difficult to define in legal doctrine. The privacy expec-
tations of a passenger are just one example of where the Court's
and society's views may differ.10
7
The relevant inquiry then becomes, of what significance should
legitimate presence have been given in this scheme? The logical
answer would be that the Jones test was not meant to be a defini-
tive statement of privacy rights in all cases. 108 Physical presence
should have been just one factor that might be indicative of the
privacy expectations of an individual. Applying these principles
and the reasoning of Justice Stevens in Lisk,10 9 one could properly
conclude that the fourth amendment interest of the passengers
was violated by the initial stop of the vehicle and the subsequent
seizure of their person. The search of the automobile and the
seizure of the items from it would not have violated their expecta-
tions of privacy unless they asserted a possessory interest in the
items, in which case they would object to the items seized even if
they were not personally present at the time of the search. Their
presence would be sufficient grounds to claim a violation as to the
search only if they could show that by frequency of use of the vehi-
cle they could reasonably be expected to have access to, and de-
mand privacy for, any items which they might place in the glove
compartment or under the seat. Thus, if the owner and driver of
the vehicle was the wife and the passenger was her husband, it
would be absurd to suggest that only the wife, by reason of her
ownership and control, could assert a reasonable expectation of
privacy." 0
106. The majority opinion began its analysis by noting this and refused to remand
the case for a consideration of the defendant's interest in the seized items. -
U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 423-24 n.1.
107. The concurring opinion suggested that passengers could almost expect a
search of the car they were riding in. "It is unrealistic-as the shared experi-
ence of us all bears witness-to suggest that these passengers had any rea-
sonable expectation that the car in which they had been riding would not be
searched after they were lawfully stopped and made to get out." - U.S. at-,
99 S. Ct. at 436 (Powell, J., concurring).
108. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting). See
generally Trager & Lobenfeld, supra note 9, at 448.
109. See text accompanying notes 93-94.
110. The facts in Rakas, showed that the driver and owner of the vehicle was the
ex-wife of one of the defendants. Petitioners' Brief for Rehearing at 3. The
relation between the defendant and his ex-wife was not closely considered by
the Court.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Court's analysis of the fourth amendment presented in
Rakas v. Illinois reflects the struggle the Court has had in anchor-
ing the amendment to recognizable constitutional principles. On
the one hand, the Court has found that a "constitutionally pro-
tected area" analysis which confines itself to property concepts
triggered by a trespass is too narrow a statement of the amend-
ment's protection. The other extreme, that the amendment cre-
ates a general constitutional right to privacy, is equally
unacceptable. To accommodate the need for stability in this area
the reasonable expectations test has not surprisingly been closely
linked to property concepts. Fourth amendment security and pri-
vacy protections, however, are not always a function of ownership
rights. The Court in discarding the legitimate presence test of
Jones, rather than clarifying its meaning, has made the evaluation
of reasonable expectations of privacy more difficult. The result
will probably be a more restrictive analysis of privacy interests by
lower courts.
Ralph F. Rayburn '80
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